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Abstract
Marine reserves are an effective tool for protecting biodiversity locally, with potential economic benefits including
enhancement of local fisheries, increased tourism, and maintenance of ecosystem services. However, fishing communities
often fear short-term income losses associated with closures, and thus may oppose marine reserves. Here we review
empirical data and develop bioeconomic models to show that the value of marine reserves (enhanced adjacent fishing +
tourism) may often exceed the pre-reserve value, and that economic benefits can offset the costs in as little as five years.
These results suggest the need for a new business model for creating and managing reserves, which could pay for
themselves and turn a profit for stakeholder groups. Our model could be expanded to include ecosystem services and other
benefits, and it provides a general framework to estimate costs and benefits of reserves and to develop such business
models.
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Introduction
Marine protected areas (MPAs) are intertidal and/or subtidal
areas that have been reserved by law or other effective means to
protect part or all of the enclosed environment, including water,
flora, fauna, and historical and cultural features [1]. MPAs were
initially proposed as a means to preserve marine biodiversity and
unique habitats, and as an opportunity for recreation, education
and research. Nevertheless, in the last two decades much of the
literature has focused on whether MPAs enhance nearby fisheries
and produce economic returns [2,3]. There are many types of
MPAs, from areas where most fishing is allowed to no-take marine
reserves where fishing is prohibited. Because it is difficult to
compare the benefits of areas with different levels of protection,
here we focus on no-take marine reserves only (‘‘marine reserves’’
hereafter). The literature is now quite clear about the conditions
under which marine reserves produce economic and/or ecological
benefits (e.g., [4,5]). Yet in focusing almost exclusively on fisheries,
this literature has ignored other, perhaps more important, aspects
of the value of marine reserves. A prime example is the tourism
value of marine reserves which may increase over time as biomass
and diversity increase within the borders of a marine reserve.
Simultaneously accounting for these, and other economic effects,
allows us to create a general model that provides the foundation
for a business case for marine reserves, taking care to estimate the
dynamics of payoffs from reserve implementation. Globally,
assembling economic arguments for, or against, marine reserves
will be crucial for determining if, and how, to achieve the targets of
the Convention of Biological Diversity that call for protection of
10% of the ocean (http://www.cbd.int/sp).
Here we synthesize information on the ecological and economic
benefits of marine reserves, and use bio-economic modeling to
show how marine reserves can be created and managed in a
financially self-sustaining manner. This model incorporates both
fishery and tourism benefits over time following the designation of
a marine reserve.
Ecological benefits of marine reserves
A review of peer-reviewed studies on 124 marine reserves in 29
countries showed that, on average, marine reserves cause increases
of 21% in the number of species, 28% in the size of organisms,
166% in density (number of individuals per unit area), and a
remarkable 446% in biomass, relative to unprotected areas nearby
[4]. However, the increase in biomass of predatory fish can be
greater than the above averages [6,7,8]. The increase in the
biomass of predators has been shown to produce a re-accommo-
dation of the food web, shifting from a degraded state typical of
intensely fished sites to a more complex, mature state. These food
web changes can enhance ecosystem resilience by promoting the
recovery of populations of functionally important species (i.e.
strong interactors [9]).
Fisheries may benefit from reserves when they help replenish
nearby habitats through spillover of adult organisms and dispersal
of larvae. The increase in the biomass of commercial species inside
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marine reserves has been shown to increase reproductive output
(e.g., [10,11]), as long as the reproductive grounds are included in
the reserves. A review by Lester et al. [4] showed that areas outside
reserves showed a significant increase in biomass after the reserve
was in place, possibly through the spillover of adults and/or the
export of larvae. Empirical studies also show that higher
abundances inside reserves can lead to spillover of adults to
nearby fished areas (Table 1). Spillover at small scales is common
for commercial species that respond positively to reserve
protection [12]. Empirical evidence on the ability of reserves to
replenish fished areas through larval dispersal is limited, partly
because of methodological/sampling issues [13], but there are
some remarkable examples (Table 1).
Economic benefits of marine reserves
Marine reserves can provide economic benefits through tourism
(diving, snorkeling, glass bottom boats), fishing (increase or
stabilization of catch around reserves), and other services, some
of which are difficult to quantify (e.g., insurance value, local
amenity value, storm protection, political value, intangible capital).
A primary concern among fishermen is the loss of fishing grounds
and yields that may occur when marine reserves are implemented;
these effects may not be offset by the increase in spillover and
dispersal of larvae provided by the reserves [14]. An additional
concern is that establishing reserves may disadvantage some
fishermen such as local smaller vessels with less potential to work
farther afield, to benefit fishers in other areas or with greater
mobility [15].
Tourism. The increase in marine life inside marine reserves,
in particular large fish, is the main attraction for divers and other
tourists, which can bring revenue disproportionately higher than
fishing (Table 1). In the wider Caribbean and Pacific coast of
Central America, for instance, 50% of all dives (7.5 million dives
annually) take place within marine protected areas [16], even
though only 4% of Caribbean coral reefs are in MPAs rated as
‘‘good’’ or ‘‘partially effective’’ [17]. This strongly indicates the
interest of divers to frequent areas with more abundant marine life.
Although no data exist on the general relationship between fish
biomass and diver frequentation, there is a clear preference for
diving in MPAs because of the expectation of encountering more
abundant marine life within their boundaries.
Fishing. Well-enforced marine reserves can increase adjacent
fishery catches (Table 1). At small scales (on average within 1 km
from the reserve boundary), local fisheries would not be
sustainable without the reserves in 12 of 14 cases studied, and
spillover offsets losses in catch due to the creation of the reserve in
the other two cases [12]. For a full review of the effects of marine
reserves on local fisheries see [18]. In addition to enhancing or
ensuring sustainable yield, marine reserves can also increase the
long-term profitability of fisheries (Table 1). It is important to note
that the data are consistent with perceptions of the status of the
fishery by the local community. In the Apo Marine Reserve in the
Table 1. Examples of economic benefits of marine reserves from fishing enhancement and tourism.
Fishing
Area Benefits Observations References
Apo Marine Reserve, Philippines Enhancement of catch of jacks and
surgeonfish
Less fishing effort brought higher
catch rates
[19]
Columbretes Islands Marine Reserve,
Spain
Net gain of .10% in weight of the
local lobster fishery catch
Caused by annual lobster spillover of
7% of the protected population.





Increased adjacent catches by 46–90% In only 5 years, despite a 35%
decrease in area of fishing grounds
[21]
Sinai Peninsula Marine Reserves,
Egypt
66% increase in catch per unit effort Within only five years of the creation
of the reserves
[51]
Mombasa Marine National Park Fisher income near reserve 135%
higher than in open access areas
Profits increased despite heavy
fishing, diverse gear and catch,
poverty, and unregulated markets
[24]
Ucunivanua marine reserve, Fiji Clams became 7 more abundant in
the adjacent fished area
After only 5 years of protection.
Caused by larval dispersal.
[13,40]
Georges Bank fishery closure Scallop recruitment increased around
the closed area
Scallop biomass increased over 14 times
over 4 years in the closed area, and
produced significant larval dispersal
[52]
Tourism
Area Annual revenue Observations References
Cabo Pulmo National Park, Mexico $12,000 per capita Higher than in most coastal
communities in Mexico
[53]
Saba Marine Park, Netherland Antilles $3 million 22% of the local economy [54]
Mombasa Marine National Park, Kenya $3.5 million km22 350 times higher than fishing revenue [55] [24]
Medes Islands Marine Reserve, Spain J10 million In only 94 ha of no-take area. 20
times higher than fishing revenue
[31]
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park,
Australia
AU$5.5 billion 36 times greater than income from
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Philippines, for example, 67–100% of the fishers interviewed
believed that the fishery was improved by the presence of the
reserve [19].
An additional value for fishing of marine reserves concerns
catch-and-release recreational fishing inside the reserves, which
may be compatible with the reserves provided that ecological
impacts can be minimized [20]. Although recreational catch-and-
release angling causes some fish mortality, it is considered an
amenity value, and it can bring more revenue than commercial
fishing to local communities. A good example is the well-regulated
fly-fishing operation at the Jardines de la Reina Marine Natural
Park, Cuba, which has an annual quota of sport fishers and
provides a significant revenue stream. Alongside diving, fishing
revenues help cover the management costs of the reserve and
provide employment for Cuban fishing guides.
Recreational fishing outside reserves may also benefits from
spillover. In Florida, the no-take areas in the Merritt Island
National Wildlife Refuge have supplied increasing numbers of
world record–sized fish to adjacent recreational fisheries since the
1970s [21].
Other services. Marine reserves help preserve and restore
biodiversity at many levels (e.g., how many species and how many
individuals of each species, and structure of the biogenic habitat;
[22]). A meta-analysis showed that the increase of species diversity
in marine reserves was associated with large increases in fisheries
productivity, a reduction in the variability of aggregate fish
biomass (which helps reduce uncertainty in fisheries), and an
increase in resistance and recovery after natural disturbances from
storms and thermal stress [5]. By restoring biodiversity, reserves
enhance the productivity and reliability of the good and services
that the ocean provides for humanity.
One of the major reasons marine reserves are not more
common is that marine ecosystems are typically dominated by
single uses such as fishing [23]. Yet the amenity value of marine
resources protected in marine reserves (via tourism) is often greater
than the commodity value of these resources (via fishing), as the
examples above show. In addition, there are other non-commod-
ified goods and services provided by marine ecosystems that can
be enhanced by marine reserves. Generally, there is a lack of the
non-market data required to quantify the value of these goods and
services and therefore these benefits are often taken for granted
[24].
By protecting coastal ecosystems such as mangroves, marshes
and seagrass beds that are threatened by coastal development,
aquaculture, agriculture and wood production, marine reserves
can play a significant role in protecting some of the most efficient
natural carbon sinks on the planet [25], enhancing coastal
protection from storms [26], and ensuring the supply of fish to
nearby fisheries [27]. For example, the value of one hectare of
mangrove per year is up to $37,500 as a nursery for commercial
fishes that will later recruit into adjacent fisheries [27], $18,000 as
gross carbon credit revenue potential (assuming a carbon price of
$15/t CO2e) [28], and $10,821 as storm protection service [29], in
addition to the protection of human life on coastal areas prone to
tropical storms. In contrast, the net economic return of one
hectare of mangrove converted into a shrimp farm in Thailand
was only up to $1220 per year in 1997–2004 [29].
Despite the increasing amount of evidence of the benefits
provided by marine reserves, there are issues that have impeded
the creation of marine reserves as a tool that yields economic
profitability. The major economic arguments against marine
reserve creation are short-term loss of fishing catch and revenue
because of the closure of a fraction of the fishing grounds, and
displacement of fishing effort to unprotected areas. The latter has
not been a significant issue to date on a global scale because only
less than 1% of the ocean is protected in marine reserves. Marine
reserves are also criticized as insufficient tools for managing
fisheries. It is important to note that the current research does not
suggest the replacement of alternative fishery management tools.
Marine reserves provide the myriad benefits described above and
may further complement traditional fishery management measures
in the long run. The next section presents a simulation model of
the time path of marine reserve benefits and costs.
Methods
Creating marine reserves can be an economically optimal
solution when the combined value derived from tourism, the
enhancement of local fisheries (via spillover from the reserve) and
other services (see above) outweighs the value of any single use in
isolation in the now-protected area. In what follows we develop a
general dynamic model to simultaneously analyze these quantifi-
able effects of marine reserves on economic welfare. In particular,
we develop a bio-economic model to simulate the value of a fishery
and the value of tourism over time for a fishery that implements a
no-take zone. We then develop a focused case study to illustrate
the economic effects of marine reserves.
Biological model
Operating model. We use a delay difference model to
simulate the population dynamics of a single species, and
parameterize the model to examine the effects on several species
with different characteristics. We assume a linear coastline divided
into 100 areas. This model tracks the species biomass in each area
each year and accounts for growth of average individuals. Using
the Deriso-Schnute biomass model [30], the biomass in patch i at




where Mt is the biomass in patch i after adult movement in year t,
si,t is the annual survival of animals age k and older, wk is the
average weight of an animal age k and older, wk{1 is the average
weight of recruits, k is the age when the fish can reproduce,r is the
Brody growth coefficient that controls the growth rate of
individual fish, and Ri,t is recruitment in patch i in year t. The
model accounts for two age classes, adults and recruits. All adults
for a given species have the same vulnerability to fishing pressure
and reproduce. This model assumes that each species is
homogeneous across all areas for all biological parameters.
The simulations begin at equilibrium biomass (Bi,0), using a





Annual survival st is the product of both natural survival s and
the survival from fishing mortality. The harvest rate u is specified
for both pre and post implementation of a no-take zone, for each
patch.
si,t~s 1{ui,tð Þ ð3Þ
Marine Reserve Business Model
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Larval dispersal, recruitment, and adult
movement. The number of eggs produced each year is assumed
to equal the spawning biomass at the beginning of each year. The
larvae are dispersed in a Gaussian fashion, so larvae do drift from
one patch to another but the proportion that derive from the
source to any given location decreases with distance between the
sites. This does not explicitly model larval advection. The relative






where d is the distance between area i and area j. The model
parameter sL defines the dispersal range for the species. The
relative proportions are then normalized so that the total
proportion of moving from area i to any area sum to one. The





Adult movement is determined using the same Gaussian
movement, with an adult movement parameter of sA.
Density dependent recruitment in each patch is calculated using
a Beverton-Holt form [30]
Ri,t~
0:8Ri,0hSi,t
0:2Bi,0 1{hð Þz h{0:2ð ÞSi,t ð6Þ
where h is the steepness parameter for the species which is
describes its productivity level.
Economic model
Fishing. The fishery catch (C) in patch i, year t, is the product






i,t is the biomass of the species after adult movement.





where c is the price per gram for the species and ci is the cost per
unit effort to fish in area i.
Tourism. Tourism values are often neglected in bioeconomic
analyses of marine reserves. We model the marginal value of
additional site visits (or ‘‘dives’’) as follows:
Pt~a0za1Dr,tza2Br,t ð9Þ
where Dr,t is the number of dives in the reserve and a0, a1, and a2
are parameters estimated for each location that the model is
applied. Here we focus on economic well-being of divers
themselves, and implicitly ignore further ancillary benefits arising
from the multiplier effect of tourism revenue in the community.
Equation 9 can be used to calculate the number of dive-days
demanded for any given price and any given level of fish
abundance by solving equation 9 for Dr,t. We can also use this to
calculate the total value divers place on dives, represented by the
consumer surplus (Fig. 1). We expect a1,0, reflecting the fact that
additional dives are increasingly less valuable. We expect a2.0,
reflecting the fact that a dive’s marginal value is positively
influenced by additional biomass in the reserve – importantly we
assume this effect is linear, which is likely to hold for modest
changes in biomass, but may not continue to hold for extremely
large increases in biomass. While we focus on the biomass of key
species, it is possible that diver demand would also depend on the
diversity of fish.
An optimal fee per dive in year t (OPt) is calculated to maximize
the tourism revenue in year t. Tourism revenue is defined as the
product of the fee per dive and the number of dives in the reserve:
Dr,tPt~Dr,t(a0za1Dr,tza2Br,t) ð10Þ
.
By taking the derivative of equation 10 with respect to Dr,t and
setting the equation equal to zero, the number of dives that















To illustrate the dynamics of the bio-economic model, we
present a simulation based on the characteristics from the Medes
Islands fishery in Spain. This case study builds from the bio-
economic analysis by Merino et al. [31] which focuses on long-run,
or equilibrium, effects of reserve implementation. Because one of
our main questions concerns the economic returns from reserves,
analyzing the inter-annual dynamics is crucial. Our goal is to
determine the time period for which the species recovery and
economic development of tourism surpass the short term loss in
fishing grounds. This case study is provided to illustrate and
example of the short term dynamics under this model for a fishery
such as the Medes Islands.
The Medes Islands Marine Reserve was created in 1983, and it
includes a no-take zone of 51 ha, and partially-protected area of
460 ha where seven local artisanal fishing vessels have exclusive
access [31]. We use parameters based on data from this fishery
(Table 2) and from a long-term ecological monitoring of the
reserve [32] to explore model predictions for this fishery upon
implementation of a marine reserve.
To simulate this reserve system, we use three harvest rates, one
for the no-take zone, one for the partial reserve and one for the
area with no reserve. The relative size of these areas matches the
relative areas of the Medes Islands zones (1%, 12% and 87%). In
these areas we simulate the biological dynamics of two represen-
tative species and their change in biomass over time. We use the
striped red mullet (Mullus surmuletus) to represent the species
Marine Reserve Business Model
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Figure 1. Hypothetical illustration of equation 9 (the solid diagonal line). Revenue and consumer surplus can be calculated as areas under
this line and change each year depending on the species biomass and number of dives. The dotted line illustrates equation 9 at higher biomass
levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058799.g001
Table 2. Parameter values for the Medes Islands Marine Reserve example.
Biological Parameters
Species s wk wk-1 r Ri,0 sL sA h
Mullus surmuletus 0.66 53.93 0 0.77 52000 2 1 0.75
Dicentrarchus labrax 0.9 384.9 0 0.85 6100 2 0.01 0.75
Fishery Parameters
M. surmuletus D. labrax
Zone u pre-reserve u post-reserve u pre-reserve u post-reserve
No-take 0.75 0 0.2 0
Restricted zone 0.75 0.375 0.2 0.1
Open access 0.75 0.75 0.2 0.2
Economic parameters
Fishery (Euros) c (J kg21) ci
9.97 9905
Tourism a0 a1 a2 Reserve fee/dive
(J)
9.6448 20.003 .00004 3.5
Parameter s is the annual natural survival rate, wk is the average weight of an animal age k and older, wk-1 is the average weight of recruits, r is the Brody growth
coefficient, Ri,0 is unfished recruitment, u is the annual harvest rate, c is the price per gram for the species, ci is the cost per unit effort to fish in area i, and a0 , a1 , and a2
are location specific parameters for the tourism model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058799.t002
Marine Reserve Business Model
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important to the fishery and European seabass (Dicentrarchus labrax)
to represent the species that divers are interested in seeing in the
water.
We conducted a second simulation mirroring management
changes that occurred at the Medes Islands Marine reserve. In
1990, the Catalan parliament passed a law that expanded the
protection and established tools for more effective conservation
management [33]. To prevent the deleterious impact of an
excessive number of divers on the fragile benthic communities of
the Medes Islands [34], the number of divers was reduced to a
maximum of 450 per day. The number of diving centers was
regulated, and each diving center has a dive quota; for divers using
their own boat there is a first-come first-serve system. These
measures were made effective in 1991. Therefore we capped the
number of dives in our model in 1991, using a fixed dive fee of J
3.5.
Results
The simulation of the Medes Islands marine reserve was run for
100 years before the implementation of the no-take and partial no-
take zones. The simulation is then run for another 100 years to
show the long term effects of implementing the reserve system.
Results from the simulation show that there is a short term loss in
fishery profit accompanied by a steady increase in the tourism
value (Fig. 2a). The tourism value accounts for the fee per dive for
visitors as well as the consumer surplus, which represents the
additional amount that visitors would have been willing to pay for
those dives. The fee per dive is assumed to be the current diver
access fee of J 3.5 per dive in the Medes Islands for each year of
the simulation. In this example, even if one only considers net
benefits (consumer surplus plus fishery value), the reserve more
than doubles the value of the marine ecosystem, with more value
arising from tourism than from fisheries. The total value of the
reserve becomes greater than the pre-reserve value within five
years of protection.
As discussed above, there are additional values of the reserve
that are not captured by this analysis. One obvious source is the
multiplier effect of diver expenditures in the local community
(hotels, restaurants, car rentals, dive equipment rental, etc.) While
we have omitted these additional sources of value, including them
would only serve to further increase the benefit of the reserve (see
Discussion for actual economic benefits of the Medes Islands
Marine Reserve).
We also consider another simulation where the fee per dive is
changed each year by calculating the optimal fee each year to
maximize tourism revenue using equation 12. This simulation
shows the possibility of increasing the tourism value (Fig. 2b).
Parameter values used in this example are listed in Table 2. Many
of the biological parameters were calculated from other known
parameter values for these species [35]. The steepness, h, was
assumed to be 0.75, which is approximately the modal for
steepness values for a range of species [36]. Initial recruitment
values for red mullet (representing all fished species) were
estimated using carrying capacity values from Merino et al. [31]
and then determining the total carrying capacity from these
species that represent 5 percent of total catch [31]. Initial
recruitment for European seabass (representing species in dive
industry) were estimated using relative abundances between the
red mullet and European seabass in the no-take zone [32].
Parameters for the fishery were chosen to illustrate a species that
is experiencing a fishing pressure beyond its maximum sustainable
yield (red mullet) and a reduced rate for nontargeted fish that are
caught as bycatch (European seabass). After the implementation of
the reserve system, the fishing pressure is assumed to drop to zero
in the no-take zone, is reduced in half in the partially-protected
area, and remains the same outside of the reserves. Estimates for
fishing costs were based on personal communications with local
fishers. Prices per kg of fish were based on prices for the red mullet
[31]. Estimates for a0, a1, and a2were calculated to reflect the
number of divers each year in the marine reserve.
The output of the model was remarkably accurate. When we
capped diver numbers at the 1991 level, we obtained 63,000 dives
per year, with a revenue generated by diving fees of J 221,000
(Fig. 2c). The actual number of dives conducted in 2009, almost 20
years after the diving quotas had been established, was 67,000
divers, whose diving fees produced a revenue of J 235,500 [33].
Discussion
An increasing number of studies show that the combined
economic benefits of marine reserves (including fishing enhance-
ment, tourism, and ecosystem services) outweigh the costs of
creating and maintaining the reserves [31,37], although to date no
reserve has been created with a business plan taking this into
account. It is worth noting that while improvements in fisheries
may be obtained by other management methods than solely
creating a reserve (e.g.; [38]) it is less likely that the tourism
benefits would be realized in this way. This is because the tourism
benefits with regard to increased fish abundance and size are
place-based rather than diffused across all areas where the fish
occur. Reserves capitalize on the location specific potential for
activities such as diving or other non-extractive uses.
Our bio-economic model shows that fishing revenue increases
after the creation of a reserve, and also that tourism revenue
surpasses the revenues from fishing. It is worth noting that the total
value of the reserve is larger than the pre-reserve value within only
five years of protection. This result is in agreement with data on
the rapid biological recovery of reserves [39] and short-term local
fisheries enhancement [13,21,40]. Therefore the typical concern
about short-term revenue losses associated to reserve creation,
especially for fishers, should be easily addressed with a proper
business plan that estimates revenue projections, accounts for
costs, and identifies financing mechanisms.
In the Medes Islands Marine Reserve example, before the
creation of the reserve, only four diving centers took tourists to the
islands, generating a revenue of about J 0.5 million. Presently, the
increased abundance of marine life in the reserve supports a
thriving tourism industry including diving centers, snorkeling, glass
bottom boats, and kayaks. The current diver access fee of J 3.5
per dive (snorkelers, kayakers, and glass bottom boat tourists do
not pay access fees) brings in J 234,500 per year, which covers
half of the annual budget for the reserve [31,33]. However, If we
add other services (hotels, restaurants) that grew in association with
the increase in number of divers, the marine reserve brings a
minimum of J 10 million annually to the local economy – and 200
full-time jobs [31,33]. Before the creation of the reserve there were
21 registered artisanal fishing boats, relative to seven professional
boats operating today. The difference in the number of active
fishers is due to retirements of ageing fishers, and a shift to more
lucrative businesses such as lodging, restaurants, and tourism.
Current fishing revenue exceeds J 0.2 million [31]. Although
there are no published statistics on the local fisheries economics,
interviews with local fishers indicate that revenue before the
creation of the reserve was lower than presently. In addition, the
areas around the Medes Islands Marine Reserve attract more than
455 recreational fishing boat visits per year, with an average
expenditure in fuel, gear and bait of J 800 per boat [41]. Payment
Marine Reserve Business Model
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for ecosystem services, such as the one afforded by the
regeneration of the seagrass Posidonia oceanica beds in the reserve
could increase income in the reserve; these and other benefits
could be added to the model. As our bio-economic model predicts,
the aggregate economic value of the Medes Islands Marine
Reserve is larger than the costs, and suggests that other reserves in
locations with similar tourism opportunities could be designed as
revenue and job creators. Our model provides a general
framework to estimate costs and benefits and plan consequently.
Uncertainty of future benefits may be one of the larger barriers
to reserve formation. The simulation model, paired with local
biological and economic data could reduce uncertainty regarding
long-run financial benefits of a potential marine reserve. The
tourism literature is rich with methodologies to estimate the price-
elasticity of demand. The model parameter a1 could be estimated
in some cases. When decisions must be made quickly and data are
lacking, literature estimates from similar locations may still provide
useful information on a1. In either case, information on divers
price sensitivity paired with the simulation model can give critical
information on potential revenues from reserve user-fees. A second
critical economic parameter, a2, reflects divers preferences for
larger and greater numbers of fish. This parameter is not as widely
estimated as price-elasticity but it is possible to estimate divers’
willingness-to-pay for increases in fish density and size [42].
Other constraints may exist to reserve creation such as capital
constraints and the ability of potential beneficiaries to coordinate
with those fishers bearing the short-term costs. Essentially,
potentially profitable reserves may suffer from incomplete markets.
Our example from Medes suggests that even for fisheries alone,
the reserve will ultimately have a positive effect. However, in many
cases, fishers, the current users might oppose reserve formation
even when models and data produce expectations of future profits.
The short-term losers may face capital constraints and may have
little reason to expect to share in future tourism benefits. Even
when future fishery benefits are credible, current fishing interests
may not hold secure claims to those future benefits.
There are many potential mechanisms that might resolve
capital and coordination constraints. In some cases, improved
legal structures guaranteeing current fishers’ shares in future
benefits may suffice. In other cases, the creation of markets for
conservation may be appropriate. Finally, external organizations
may wish to speed the formation of reserves by offering a buy-out
to reduce fishing effort in the fishing zone, or by financing the loss
in fishery value during the time gap between reserve implemen-
tation and fishery recovery. Possible financing mechanisms include
private investments and public/private partnerships, some of
which have proven successful in other social initiatives and
businesses. In addition to facilitating the transition from open
access to a system with a fraction of the fishing grounds closed as
Figure 2. Example simulation based on the Medes Islands marine reserve. A) The reserve is implemented in year zero and the fishery profit
and total value (fishery and tourism combined) show short term losses before long term gains. The tourism value increase monotonically over time
after implementation of the reserve. B) Medes Islands example with optimal fee per dive calculated each year. C) Medes Islands example capping the
number of dives as those in 1991, to simulate actual management changes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0058799.g002
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reserves, these mechanisms could cover the costs of creation and
management of reserves, making them self-sustaining.
Metrics for success will be critical for long-run benefits to be
realized. We cannot conclude that a reserve is failing only because
it is not enhancing the catch of one or more species around it (e.g.,
[43]). That may be simply due to excessive fishing capacity/effort
(regardless of the closure of a fraction of the fishing grounds), and
the reserve may be too small or located in a sub-optimal location.
Furthermore, aggregate benefits afforded by protection may be
much greater than the putative loss of fisheries yield. For instance,
a fishery targeting a spawning aggregation of large predatory reef
fishes will yield lower catches right after the spawning grounds are
protected. However, fishing spawning aggregations universally
leads to collapse of the aggregations, the populations of the species,
and the fisheries they support [44]; whereas the increase in value
of the aggregation site through ecotourism and replenishment of
adjacent fishing grounds will far offset the short term loss of fishing
profit [45]. It is thus essential that, for evaluating the efficacy of a
marine reserve, the economic dynamics around the reserve are
compared to those in similar areas without reserves.
The economic benefits of marine reserves may be enhanced by
additional management around their borders (e.g., TURFs,
individual transferable quotas) [46,47,48] and co-designing marine
reserves with other spatial management measures can further
increase benefits [49]. In any case, a business approach could help
replicate the success stories in a decentralized way that is not
constrained by limited human and financial resources from
governments and conservation organizations.
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